utterances was kept constant across the different conditions of the experiment. It is difficult to assert that these voluntary aspects of speech production should, or could, be added to speech separately from the "digital" information bound up in the phonemes, syllables, and words of a language. Our recent results suggest that this kind of flexibility is an integral part of the planning and control of speech and voluntary vocal behaviour.
Not all vocal modulations can be added to speech in a controlled manner. Ackermann and colleagues argue that linguistic and emotional prosodic information, which they see as digital and analogue, respectively, are coordinated in the basal ganglia, as "Otherwise these two inputs would distort and corrupt each other" (target article, sect. 1.2, para. 2). It is reductive to draw boundaries between linguistic and paralinguistic aspects of vocal behaviour, particularly when considering the role of linguistic prosody in disambiguation (e.g., the contrast between a question and a statement). Furthermore, it is certainly the case that emotional states do corrupt articulate speech, as is shown when a person tries to produce speech during a fit of laughter, when overcome with grief, or when feeling extremely nervoushere, the voluntary control of vocalization is compromised, and articulate speech is taken over by the physiological effects of emotion on the functions of the vocal tract; see our Figure 1 (cf. Levenson 2003) .
Ackermann et al. claim that the basal ganglia might be essential for the acquisition of articulate speech during early childhood, while the behaviours of the mature speech production system are controlled by perisylvian cortical structures. There is evidence that the plasticity of vocal learning reduces in adolescence and adulthood, for example, the marked persistence of first-language pronunciation in adult learners of a second language (Flege et al. 1999a; 1999b) . However, speech can change in adulthoodone study showed that vowels in the speech of Queen Elizabeth II have, over several decades, gradually moved closer to the standard British English spoken by her subjects (Harrington et al. 2000) . Similarly, there is extensive evidence for the recovery of speech in the adult system after stroke (Blank et al. 2003) . It is difficult to estimate the extent to which these gradual changes in speech come about under conscious voluntary control. We continue to learn new information at all levels of the linguistic hierarchy throughout the lifespan, and the extent to which an individual changes their speech, voluntarily or not, can vary over both long and short timescales. With reference to the authors' proposal, we therefore pose the question: How do relearned and remapped behaviours in the adult speech production system fit within a model where the contributions of the basal ganglia end after childhood language acquisition?.
We are encouraged by an approach to modelling human vocal behaviour that incorporates its social, emotional, and linguistic aspects. However, we urge caution in attempts to divide the speech signal into distinct types of information served by specific underlying functional subsystems. We argue that vocal behaviour is better characterized in terms of voluntary versus involuntary control of a complex motor act, regardless of its informational content. Further, given the evidence that vocal behaviour remains plastic and flexible into adulthood, we question the extent to which this plasticity need be mechanistically distinct from childhood language acquisition.
Why vocal production of atypical sounds in apes and its cerebral correlates have a lot to say about the origin of language Abstract: Ackermann et al. mention the "acquisition of species-atypical sounds" in apes without any discussion. In our commentary, we demonstrate that these atypical sounds in chimpanzees not only include laryngeal sounds, but also have a major significance regarding the origins of language, if we consider looking at their context of use, their social properties, their relations with gestures, their lateralization, and their neurofunctional correlates as well.
Whether apes are able to voluntarily and intentionally control their vocal production remains a topic of intense debate (e.g., Hopkins et al. 2011) . In a brief paragraph in their target article (sect. 2.1.4.), Ackermann et al. mention the "observational acquisition of species-atypical sounds" in apes and acknowledge that chimpanzees are able to produce voluntary sounds using the modulation of the air through the lips ("blowing raspberries" or "kiss"). However, the authors also claimed that apes are not able to "engage laryngeal sound-production mechanisms" that can be "decoupled volitionally from species-typical audiovisual displays." In fact, this latter claim is not accurate.
Hopkins et al. (2007) have indeed described the use of two atypical novel "learned" sounds produced by several chimpanzees among the captive groups from the Yerkes Primate Research Center: Some chimpanzees are not only able to produce non-voiced "raspberries" or "kiss" sounds (involving only the lips with the air of the mouth) but also "extended grunts," which clearly engage the vocal tract and laryngeal sound-production mechanisms. Hopkins and colleagues showed that the production of these atypical sounds and vocalizations is often produced with pointing gestures and is used exclusively in the presence of both a human and an out-of-reach food in order to beg for food, while typical species-specific "food calls" were more frequent in the presence of food alone (Hopkins et al. 2007 ). Such atypical productions were interpreted as signals used intentionally to capture the attention of the human. Indeed, great apes have been shown to use those acoustic signalsvocal and lips sounds, cage banging or clapping gesturesespecially when the recipient is not attentive, whereas visual pointing gestures are preferentially used when the recipient is attentive (e.g., Leavens et al. 2004; 2010 ; see also in orangutans: Cartmill & Byrne 2007; for a review of the literature, see Hopkins et al. 2011) . In other words, the multimodal flexibility of communicative signaling (sounds, vocalizations, and gestures) is a manifestation of the ability of the great apes to adjust the modality of the signal to the attentional state of the recipient, and such an intentional property might be thus a special feature of social cognition that is needed in language processing.
In addition, given the inter-individual variability among chimpanzees concerning the ability to produce or not those novel sounds, it has been interpreted that, as for human speech but in contrast to species-typical vocalizations, those atypical vocal and lip sounds might be socially learned. In fact, it has been reported that chimpanzees raised by biological mothers who were able to produce those sounds, were more likely to also be able to do so than chimpanzees raised by humans in a nursery (Taglialatela et al. 2012) . Moreover, among the chimpanzees that were not able to produce these atypical vocalizations, a recent study not only showed that (i) it was possible to explicitly train them to do so using operant conditioning, but also (ii) that those subjects would further use these novel vocalizations in a communicative context for getting the attention of a human (Russell et al. 2013 ).
Finally, the investigation of lateralization of those atypical sounds and its functional cerebral correlates show some continuity with the language system. Indeed, most of the language functions involve a left-hemispheric dominance (Knecht et al. 2000) . Interestingly, it turns out that these chimpanzee auditory signals, when produced simultaneously with food-begging pointing gestures, induce a stronger right-hand preference than when the gesture is produced alone (Hopkins & Cantero 2003) , indicating that the left hemisphere may be more activated when producing both gestures and these atypical vocal and lip sounds simultaneously. Moreover, measures of orofacial asymmetries for vocal production in chimpanzees have showed that species-typical vocalizationssuch as food barks or pant-hootelicited a leftsided orofacial asymmetry (i.e., right-hemispheric dominance), whereas atypical attention-getting sounds elicited an asymmetry toward the right side of the mouth, indicating that, as for righthandedness for communicative clapping gestures (Meguerditchian et al. 2012 ), a left-hemispheric dominance might be involved for producing those acoustical signals (Losin et al. 2008 ). More impressively, brain imaging studies (PET [positive emission tomography]) conducted in three captive individuals have found that communicative signaling for begging food from a human by using either gestures, atypical attention-getting sounds, or both of these modalities simultaneously, activated a homologous region of Broca's area (IFG) predominantly in the left hemisphere (Taglialatela et al. 2008 ), a pattern of activation which is enhanced in subjects who used both gestural and vocal signals simultaneously (Taglialatela et al. 2011) .
These collective findings support the idea that the atypical orofacial and vocal sounds in chimpanzees are a good illustration of the potential existence of a multimodal intentional system that integrates gestures, orofacial, and atypical vocal sounds into the same lateralized system. This multimodal communicative system not only shares some features of social cognition and social learning with human language, but also seems to be ultimately related to brain specialization for language (Meguerditchian et al. 2011 ). This theory is consistent with the evidence that in humans, a single integrated communication system in the left cerebral hemisphere might be in charge of both vocal and gestural linguistic communication (e.g., Gentilucci & Dalla Volta 2008) . For all of these reasons, and their implications for the precursors of human language and its brain specialization, we believe that Ackermann et al. should better consider these voluntary laryngeal soundproduction mechanisms in chimpanzees and the related multimodal communicative system, in their theoretical model. Speech, vocal production learning, and the comparative method doi:10.1017/S0140525X13004147
Bjorn Merker
Fjälkestadsv. 410-82, SE-29194, Kristianstad, Sweden. gyr694c@tninet.se Abstract: The faith that "comparative analysis of the behaviour of modern primates, in conjunction with an accurate phylogenetic tree of relatedness, has the power to chart the early history of human cognitive evolution" (Byrne 2000 p. 543) runs afoul of the fact that no other primate besides humans is capable of vocal production learning. This basic enabling adaptation for articulate speech bears crucially on the reconstruction of language origins.
In their target article Ackermann et al. make a valiant attempt to assemble a comprehensive account of the origin and neural organization of human speech on the basis of arguments confined by and large to comparative primatology. The nature of their topic is ill-suited to such an approach, because at its core lies a behavioral adaptation and corresponding neural mechanism which we share with some species of cetaceans, pinnipeds, and birds, but not with any nonhuman primate. For such a situation, the comparative method offers analogy instead of homology as guiding concept (e.g., the elucidation of body form in cetaceans is better served by turning to distant fishes rather than to far closer relatives among extant mammals).
The capacity in question is the ability to learn to reproduce, by voice, patterns of sound first received by ear. This capacity is of singular biological uselessness except in special cases, one of which happens to be us humans, because every word and phrase we know how to pronounce has become ours by such means. Technically, the capacity is known as vocal production learning (Janik & Slater 1997; 2000) , and though the concept does occur in the target article, it is more by way of an afterthought than as a principal pivot of analysis.
Putting vocal production learning at center stage removes the mystery of the "speechlessness" of even our closest primate relatives rightly emphasized by Ackermann and colleagues. Lacking the vocal learning mechanism (Janik & Slater 1997), they naturally cannot do that which inherently is dependent upon it, namely, learn to pronounce words and phrases of rather arbitrary phonemic composition. That vocal learning is, in fact, the crux of the matter is demonstrated by the ease with which numerous species of parrots and other mimics among the birds do what no chimpanzee has ever done: acquire a substantial repertoire of human words and phrases pronounced with a fidelity that fools the human ear (Nottebohm 1976) .
The diction of bird mimics tells us that the entire pronunciatory part of the speech equation is a matter of being a vocal learner.
Step 1 on the path to speech is accordingly to come into possession of the capacity for vocal learning. This first step, moreover, provides a plausible evolutionary context for the first step invoked by Ackermann et al., namely, the addition of direct (monosynaptic) cortical efference to lower brainstem motor nuclei controlling larynx, pharynx, tongue, and lips.
The species distribution of such direct connections (to which can be added direct cortical innervation of the nucleus retroambiguus for respiratory control) suggests that they evolve specifically for cerebral fine control of respiration and vocalization and not (as the target article assumes) as a general concomitant of brain expansion (Arriaga & Jarvis 2013; Fitch et al. 2010; Iwatsubo et al. 1990; Jürgens 2002a; Kuypers 1958a; 1958b; Merker 2009; Okanoya & Merker 2007; Okanoya et al. 2007; Wild 1993; 1997) .
As suggested in a previous BBS commentary (Merker 2009), it is even conceivable that the "simple" addition, in ancestral Homo, of a direct primary motor cortex efference to those medullary motor nuclei sufficed to recruit the already present cerebral territories centered on Wernicke's and Broca's areas (see Fig. 12 .4 of Falk [2007] for putative homologs in Pan and Macaca; see also Neubert et al. 2014) to the practice-based acquisition of complex vocal output matching auditory models, thus making our ancestors vocal learners.
The most common use of vocal production learning in nature is as a means to impress potential mates and rivals by mastery of a complex song tradition (for the evolutionary logic, see Merker [2012] and review by Spencer & MacDougall-Shackleton [2011] ). Humans are a singing species (von Humboldt 1836/ 1971), so the default assumption would be that the vocal learning capacity of our ancestors was exercised for similar purposes. If so, they were maintaining traditions of intergenerationally transmitted and culturally learned vocal lore (song) long before that lore became verbal by being semanticized.
